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CONTRACTS

TO MAKE WILLS

CONTRACTS TO MAKE WILLS
William M. James*
N recent years there has been an increasing amount of

litigation arising out of agreements to make wills. As
a consequence the lawyer of today, who is doing probate
work, must acquaint himself with these agreements, their
validity and enforceability.
It is not intended that this article shall constitute a
brief on this subject but it is the purpose of the writer to
discuss several of the more important legal aspects of
such agreements.
EXAMPLES OF

How

THESE CONTRACTS ARISE

In order to get a clearer understanding of the various
phases of this question, it would seem advisable at the
outset to examine the circumstances which most frequently give ri'e to these agreements. Among the more
familiar examples is the case where a certain person has
given his property to another, the donee to have the use
of the principal and income arising therefrom during his
life and to make a will devising all of the property which
he may have at his death back to the original donor. For
instance, suppose a husband dies leaving a will in which
he bequeaths his property to his wife and children. One
of the children then desiring that his mother shall have
the use of the income and principal of his father's estate,
which is devised to him, gives the property so received by
him from his father to his mother, and in consideration
of this gift to her, the mother agrees to make a will
leaving all the property she may own at the time of her
death, to the son, who made the transfer to her.
A second example is where two persons each agree
to make a will in favor of the other with the understanding that the survivor shall take all.
*Professor of Law at Chicago-Kent College of Law.
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A third case is where a promisor agrees to devise or
bequeath his estate, or a stipulated portion of it, to a person in consideration of such person rendering services to
the promisor for a certain stipulated time or for the remainder of the promisor's life.
A fourth example is where one transfers his property
to another, the transferee agreeing to support the donor
as long as the donor shall live, and to leave a will devising the property transferred, back to the donor in the
event the donor survives the donee.
Then again an agreement of this type may also arise
out of an "ante-nuptial agreement," whereby a man
agrees with a woman that if she will marry him, he will
devise and bequeath to her a stipulated sum in excess of
the amount which she would be entitled to receive as his
widow in the event she survives him.
Post-nuptial agreements may also give rise to a contract to make a will. For instance, a husband in consideration of his wife's releasing her right of dower in and to
his real estate may agree with her that he will devise and
bequeath to her certain stipulated property in excess of
what she would be entitled to receive were she to survive
him. The foregoing examples are a few of the more
common ones which give rise to agreements to make
wills. It is, of course, conceivable that these agreements
could arise in many other ways.
PREREQUISITES TO VALIDITY

When the first effort was made to enforce agreements
of this type it was contended that they were contrary to
public policy and therefore void. It has, however, been
so generally held that these contracts are not contrary to
public policy that it would seem unnecessary to refer to
any decisions on this point. For an agreement of this
kind to be valid, there are, however, certain requisites
which must be complied with.
In the first place the parties to the agreement must be
possessed of the capacity to contract. This principle was
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discussed in Howe v. Watson et al., 179 Mass., 30. In
this case the person who had agreed to make a will
leaving her property to the plaintiff, was at the time of
making the agreement, eighty-five years of age and in
poor health. The testimony showed that at the time she
wrote the letter which constituted the agreement, she was
dressed and sitting up and appeared to be sane. Her
mind seemed as clear as it had ever been. There was
some conflicting testimony by the attending physician that
the mental faculties of the deceased were impaired to a
great extent. This testimony was corroborated in some
degree by the nurse of the deceased. Nevertheless, it
was held that the evidence taken as a whole was sufficient
to support a finding by the Master that the deceased was
of sound mind at the time she made the agreement, and,
therefore, had the capacity to contract. This case illustrates the principle that the parties to an agreement to
make a will, like the parties to any other contract, must
have the capacity to contract. Such a contract in order to
be enforceable must also be fair and equitable. This rule
was adhered to by the court in Hanly v. Hanly, 105 N.
Y. App. Div. 335, in which case the court said that before
an agreement of this type will be enforced it must be fair
and equitable in its terms. This precise language was
also used by the Court of Appeal of N. Y. in Hamlin v.
Stevens, 69 N. E. 118, and several other well-considered
cases.
In common with other contracts an agreement to make
a will in order to be binding must also be mutually
accepted by the parties thereto. This principle is well
illustrated in Rose v. Oliver, et al., 32 Ore., 337. This
was a suit filed by the plaintiff, to require the heirs of the
deceased to specifically perform a certain contract alleged
to have been entered into between the plaintiff and the deceased, whereby the deceased agreed to make a will devising and bequeathing all his property at the date of his
death to the plaintff, to the exclusion of the other heirs at
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law. The testimony in the case showed that the proposed
devisee may have voluntarily complied in substance with
the terms of the alleged agreement, but that he was not
in fact under any obligation to accept the offer and proposal or the alleged promise of the deceased. The court
in its opinion pointed out that "a proposition that certain
property shall be devised to another in consideration of
certain services to be performed for the devisor during
his life is not binding, and specific performance cannot be
enforced where there is no acknowledgment of its terms
showing a mutual agreement thereto although the proposed devisee may have voluntarily substantially complied with the terms thereof." In other words, whatever
is to be done by the promisee must be pursuant to the
terms of the agreement, with knowledge by both parties
that the promisee is electing to be bound by the agreement and is endeavoring to fulfill his part of it.
A contract of this type must, of course, be supported
by a valid consideration. This consideration, however,
may be in a variety of forms. For example, in the case
of Evans v. Moore, 247 I1, 60, the court held that an
agreement by a land owner to devise his property to his
nephew if the latter would leave his parents and relatives, renounce allegiance to his country, come to the
United States to live and become a citizen thereof, was
founded upon a valuable consideration, and would be enforced if the contract had been complied with by the
promisee. In the case of Oswald v. Nehls, et al., 233
Ill. 438, the consideration was in the form of services to
be rendered by the proposed devisee and was held
sufficient to support an agreement to make a will. These
are only a few of the many types of consideration which
will support these agreements. It is also necessary that a
contract to make a will be certain and definite in its terms.
This is particularly true where it is sought to enforce a
contract to make a will where such contract is contrary to
the statute of frauds. In Smith v. Smith, 5 Bush, Ky.
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625, the plaintiff sought to enforce a written contract
which contained the following provision: "It being the
express agreement and understanding between the parties
hereto that on a final distribution of his estate, the said
Peter Smith intends-to make the aforesaid children, who
represent their father, the said Noah Smith, equal in all
things with his son." It was contended by the defendants
that these words imposed no obligation on the deceased,
constituted a mere expression of his feelings and purposes at the time he signed the agreement and were merely explanatory of the motives which induced him to enter
into the agreement. The court held that the foregoing
portion of the contract, together with other words contained in the contract were sufficiently definite to constitute an obligation on the part of the promisor to make
the children of Noah Smith equal with his son L. C.
Smith in the distribution of the promisor's estate. In
Brandes v. Brandes, et al, 129 Ia. 351, two of the cross
petitioners alleged that the deceased, who was their
grandfather, because of certain matters, had agreed to
made provision for them in his will and that certain land
devised to them by the deceased was so devised in pursuance of such agreement and therefore that the widow's
dower should be set apart for her from other property
owned by the deceased at his death. The evidence adduced in support of these allegations showed that the
testator had merely remarked that he would remember
them but did not indicate how nor the particular consideration for which this should be done. The court in refusing to enforce the claim of the cross-petitioners pointed
out that the alleged contract between them and the deceased was entirely too indefinite to entitle them to the
relief prayed for. In the same case a second agreement
by the deceased to make a will was alleged. It was contended that in this agreement the deceased and his wife,
then residing in their home on Lots 10 and 11, proposed
to the promise that if she would move there with
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her family and take care of them in their old age,
she should have said lots 10 and 11 and also lot 12 after
their death; that she accepted the proposition and fully
performed her part of the agreement. The agreement
as alleged was substantially proved and the court held
that it was sufficiently definite and certain in its terms to
justify the court in enforcing it. This case is particularly
interesting because of the fact that two different agreements are sought to be enforced, one of which is held unenforceable because it is not sufficiently certain and
definite in its terms, and the other of which was enforced
because it was sufficiently certain and definite in its terms.
But not only must there be a certainty as to the property
to be devised but the contract must also be certain as to
the promisee. In the case of Howe v. Wilson, et al.,
179 Mass., 30, hereinbefore referred to, the contract of
the decedent was in the form of a letter to her "sister
Ellen" in which she offers to leave her property to the
latter on certain conditions. The Court held that the
words "sister Ellen" constitute a sufficient description of
the promisee to constitute a valid contract, it appearing
from the evidence that the deceased had only one sister
named "Ellen." Also in connection with the degree of
certainty required with respect to the property to be devised or bequeathed the court held in this same case that
a contract to leave all the property that one party thereto
may own at her death to the other party contains a sufficient description of the property.
It must further appear that the contract is free from
fraud, undue influence and is not unconscionable. This
principle was recognized in Jenkins v. Stetson, 9 Allen
Mass. 128.
It would also seem that if the contract is in parol, a
higher degree of proof is required. Contracts to make
wills, as said in Hamlin v. Stevens, 177 N. Y. 39, "should
be in writing, and the writing should be produced, or, if
ever based upon parol evidence, it should be given or
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corroborated in all substantial particulars by disinterested witnesses. Unless they (such contracts) are established clearly by satisfactory proofs, and are equitable,
specific performance should not be decreed." The application of the statute of frauds to contracts of this character will be discussed later.
PERFORMANCE

Having now determined that contracts of this type
will be enforced and also having briefly discussed several
of the requisites of such contracts, let us see what constitutes a performance on the part of the promisor. In
other words, if the promisor were to devise property of
lessvalue or were to devise a 'smaller estate or were to devise property and place a condition upon the devise when
the agreement was for an absolute and unconditional bequest, would the contract then be sufficiently performed?
These points have been discussed in a number of cases.
In Phalen v. United States Trust Co., 186 N. Y. 178, it
was held that a devise of property of less value than
originally agreed upon did not constitute a sufficient per.
formance. Again in Parrott, et al, v. Gaves' Ex'x, 32
S., 605, the court pointed out that a devise of a smaller
estate than agreed upon was not a sufficient performance,
and in Crofoot v. Layton, et al, 68 Conn. 91, the Court
very ably pointed out that a devise or bequest upon condition would not amount to a sufficient performance of
an agreement where the agreement called for an absolute
and unconditional bequest or devise.
WHEN BREACH OCCURS

As a general proposition it can safely be said that a
breach of a contract of this type does not occur before
the death of the promisor. Nor can there be a breach
under certain circumstances. For example, it was held in
9 C. B., 1 by the Court of Common Pleas that where
performance becomes impossible as by the death of the
promisor during the life of the testator the agreement
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becomes unenforceable. Performance may also be excused as where there is an abandonment by mutual consent as was the case in Alfred B. Stockley, ddmr. v. Win.
Goodwin, 78 Ill., 127, provided, however, that the
abandonment by the promisor has not been condoned by
the testator as was the case in Burns v. Smith, et al., 21
Mont. 251. In connection with the breach of a contract
of this type the question frequently arises, what is the
effect of a conveyance before death to a third person?
A distinction is made where the agreement is to make a
particular disposition of property and where the agreement merely covers the property which the promisor may
leave by will. In Evans v. Moore, et al, 247 Ill., 60,
the Court pointed out that where a land owner agreed to
devise his property to his nephew and the agreement was
based upon a valid consideration and there was performance of the conditions by the nephew, he would be entitled to have the agreement carried out as against a voluntary grantee or devisee of the promisor, there being no
question of the rights of bona fide purchasers involved.
On the other hand in Austin v. Davis, et al, 128 Ind. 472,
where the agreement was to leave to the promisee whatever property the promisor may leave by will, it was held
that the promisor retained all right of disposition thereof
during his life and a voluntary gift of it to his wife not
made with intent to defraud the promisee passes title
thereto free from all charges arising out of his contract
with the promisee.
CAUSE OF ACTION ACCRUES

While the breach of an agreement to make a will does
not ordinarily occur before the death of the promisor,
it is possible for such an agreement to be repudiated by
the promisor in his lifetime, in which event a cause of
action accrues for relief by way of recission or recovery
of damages. The promisee cannot, however, bring an
action to specifically enforce the agreement until the
death of the promisor. In Chantland v. Sherman 148
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Ia., 352, these same principles were discussed, and the
court said "an agreement to make a will may not be specifically enforced until the death of the party agreeing to
execute the will, but upon repudiation of such agreement
by denying its existence, or by disposing of the property
to be willed, a cause of action may accrue for the enforcement of the agreement through an analogous relief, recission, or the recovery of damages. Otherwise
performance might be defeated by rendering it impossible by the disposition of the property or through inability to prove the contract after the death of the
promisor." In Carmichael v. Carmichael 72 Mich. 76,
a conveyance to a third person was set aside and a decree directed to be entered such as would prevent the
party promising to make the will from violating the
agreement. In Duvale v. Duvale 54 N. J. Eq. 581, a
wife, who, on ample consideration, had promised to execute a will of certain property to her husband, repudiated the agreement and in a suit to protect the husband's
rights the vice chancellor said, "While it is true that a
promise to make a certain will is not broken until the
death of the promisor and it is true that actions in which
such promises have been enforced have been in cases occurring after the death of the promisor, yet I do not see
why the court cannot, upon the principle of quia timet, fix
upon the property a liability to answer tie promise, in
any case where the promisor has, during life, repudiated
its terms, and attempted to make other disposition of the
property." Also in Yanduyne v. Breeland, 12 N. J. Eq.
142, the chancellor recognized the right of the promisee
to protection upon the principle of quia timet.
METHODS OF ENFORCEMENT

Where there has been a breach of an agreement to
make a will the question immediately arises, how shall
the promisee seek to enforce the agreement? Several
methods may be resorted to, depending on the nature
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of the property to be willed, the terms of the contract,
and whether or not it was in parol only. Where the
agreement was to devise real estate, the most common
method is by filing a bill in equity whereby the promisee
seeks to impress the real estate with a trust and prays
specific performance of the agreement. That equity has
the power to decree specific performance of such an
agreement can hardly be questioned in view of the numerous decisions throughout the United States holding
that such a right exists in a court of chancery. As was
pointed out in Edwards v. Brown et al, 308 Ill. 350,
"Contracts to devise or convey real estate will be enforced in courts of equity by specific performance on the
ground that the law will not do perfect and complete
justice." Agreements to make wills have in proper cases
been held enforceable in actions at law as well as in
equity. For example in the case of Frost v. Tarr, 53
Ind. 390, the court held that an action at law for damages for the violation of an agreement to make a will
will lie against the personal representative of the promisor, and in such case the damages may be measured by
the value of the portion promised and the plaintiff will
not be limited to the value of the services rendered by
him as the consideration for the agreement. Also, it has
been held that where the agreement on the part of the
promisee is to render service to the promisor, an action
can be maintained on the common counts to recover the
value of the service rendered. This method of enforcement was permitted in Ginders v. Ginders, 21 Ill. App.
522. In this case the court used the following language:
"If the services of the promisee were rendered under an
agreement with the deceased, that she would remain with
and work for him during his lifetime, and that he would
provide her a home and support upon his death and he
did not do so, then the promisee may recover of his administrator as upon a quantum meruit." It has also
been held that such an agreement may be enforced by
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filing a claim against the decedent's estate. This method
of enforcing the contract was used in re Mallory's estate, 35 N. Y. Supp. 155. In this case it was held that
where the claimant furnished board to deceased under
an agreement that he should receive therefor whatever
she left at her death, the full amount therefor should be
allowed, without regard to the value of the services. It
has also been held that where a party to an agreement
to make a will, which agreement is void because of the
statute of frauds, fails to perform his contract, the other
party may recover back the amount paid under the contract though the contract be a nullity and no action can
be maintained upon it. This rule was applied in the case
of Smith v. Smith 28 N. J. L., 208. There a son of the
promisor occupied as tenant from year to year the farm,
which was owned by his father. The son erected buildings upon the land with the consent and approbation of
the father and upon the parol promise of the latter that
he should have the farm, either by deed or devise, on
the death of the father. This contract was held to be
void because of the statute of frauds. But the court held
that the son was entitled to recover from the estate of
his father the value of the improvements placed upon
the land.
EVIDENCE ADMISSABLE

Whenever it is sought to enforce an agreement to
make a will the question necessarily arises can the plaintiff testify in his or her own behalf as to transactions or
conversations with the deceased before his death. Naturally the capacity of the plaintiff to testify must necessarily depend largely upon the statutes in the different
jurisdictions. A good illustration of this is found in
Showers v. Warwick 152 Ill. 356, where the Supreme
Court in construing the Evidence Act of Illinois held that
the complainant in a suit against the heirs and devisees
to enforce the specific performance of a verbal agreement to convey land is not, nor is her husband, a com-
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petent witness, but in Oswald v. Nehls, et al., 233 Ill. 438
the court held that the complainant could testify in her
own behalf as to performance of the contract in so far
as it effects the land which the children hold as voluntary
grantees, even though as to the land they hold as heirs
she is not competent to testify. Regardless, however, of
what testimony may be admitted by the court, the same
will be carefully scrutinized. As was stated in Garrer
v. Shook 306 Ill. 154, "Courts of equity look with jealousy upon evidence offered in support of a contract to
make a disposition of the property of a deceased person
different from that provided by law and will weigh such
evidence in the most scrupulous manner." The court
further stated that "the proof which will justify a court
of equity in decreeing the specific performance of a contract for a conveyance, the existence of which depends
upon parol testimony must be clear and conclusive and
there must be no reasonable doubt that the contract was
made and that all its terms have been clearly proven."
APPLICATION OF STATUTE OF FRAUDS

The defense most frequently asserted by the defendants to actions brought to enforce agreements to make
wills is the Statute of Frauds. There are three sections
of the Statute of Frauds which the defendants have at
one time or another sought to apply to these cases. The
one most commonly interposed is that portion of the
statute which provides in substance that "no action shall
be brought to charge any person upon any contract for
the sale of lands unless the contract be in writing."
There can be no doubt that parol contracts to devise real
estate fall within this portion of the statute. However,
an exception has been made to this rule in many jurisdictions. For example, in the case of Mayo v. Mayo 302
Ill. 584 the court said: "The statute of frauds is designed to prevent fraud and it cannot be invoked to prevent the enforcement of a promise to convey land in re-
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turn for services rendered where failure to enforce the

contract will amount to a fraud upon the promisee."

In

Horton v. Stegmyer 175 Fed. 756, the court stated the

exception even more broadly.

The court said:

"It is

that part performance of such an agreement by delivery

of possession of the property to the proposed devisee or
by other similar acts which are unavoidably referable to
the contract, which will take it out of the statute, as they
will other parol contracts to sell land." The court further said, "And there are cases in which long and patient
service in reliance upon such a contract have been held to
constitute such a part performance as would render enforceable the agreement," citing Stone v. Todd 49 N. J.
L. 274. However, in this connection the court further
called attention to the fact that "The part performance
which will withdraw such a contract from the ban of the
statute must consist of an act or of acts which it clearly
appears that the performing parties would not have done
in the absence of the agreement or without a direct view
to its performance." It has been further urged that the
section of the statute which requires that "a contract not
to be performed within a year from the making thereof"
must be in writing, applies to agreements to make wills.
This contention has been held untenable, however, upon
the theory that the contract may become capable of being performed by the parties within a year. In the case
entitled Story, et al. v. Story, et al. 61 S. W. 279 the
court overruled the contention that this section of the
statutes of frauds applied and stated: "Where a contract depends upon an event that may happen within a
year, it is not within the Statute of Frauds, although the
parties may in fact contemplate that the contract will
probably extend over a considerable length of time." The
next section of the Statute of Frauds which it has been
claimed applies to contracts to make wills is that portion
of the statute which provides that "contracts to sell personal property in excess of a certain value shall not be

CONTRACTS

TO MAKE WILLS

enforceable unless some note or memorandum in writing
of the contract or sale be signed by the party to be
charged or his agent in that behalf." Where the agreement is to bequeath personal property in excess of the
amount provided for in the statute and the agreement is
not in writing it may fall within this section unless there
has been such part performance as to take it out of the
statute. If, however, we are to disregard this section of
the Statute of Frauds and hold that it has no application
to an agreement to make a will, then it may become necessary to determine what is the effect of the section of
the statute relating to the sale of real estate where the
agreement is not only to devise real estate but to bequeath personal property. It has been held that where
the contract is to devise real estate and bequeath personal property it is wholly within this section of the statute if it is indevisable. At least it can safely be said
that a parol contract to devise and bequeath real and personal property is void as to the real estate in the absence
of partial performance or some other act taking the contract out of the statute of frauds.
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

The question has arisen in a number of cases as to
when the statute of limitations commences to run. This
point was passed upon by the court of appeals of Kentucky in Story v. Story, 61 S. W. 279. In this case the
court held that a cause of action did not accrue upon a
contract to make provision for another by will until the
death of the promisor and that the statute of limitations
does not begin to run until that time. Where, however,
a suit is based upon a quantum meruit to recover for the
value of the service rendered and the Statute of Limitations is pleaded in defense, it has been held that the plaintiff can only recover for his services for the time allowed
for bringing suit next before presenting his claim; and
in Illinois it was held that in computing the time, there
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must be deducted the time that elapsed between the death
of the promisor and the day fixed by the administrators
of his estate for the adjustment of claims against the estate. This rule was followed by the Illinois Supreme
Court in Freeman v. Freeman, 65 Ill. 106,- the Statute
of Limitations in Illinois having been five years at the
time this action was brought.
Also where there has been an unequivocal repudiation
of the contract in the life-time of the promisor it has
been stated that the Statute of Limitations will commence to run from the date of such repudiation.
CONCLUSION
From the foregoing discussion it is apparent that a
contract to make a will, if properly entered into, is a binding contract, which will be enforced by the courts. There
seems to be no valid reason why courts of equity should
not enforce a contract of this type. However, where the
contract is not in writing, as is so often the case, it would
seem advisable for the court to scrutinize the evidence
carefully to prevent the possibility of fraud entering into
the proceeding. A careful examination of some of the
cases which have been carried to the higher courts reveals
that efforts have been made to establish a contract to
make a will, where it is obvious that no such contract ever
existed. This fact, combined with the further fact that
so many of these suits are being commenced, leads to the
inevitable conclusion that the language of the Supreme
Court of Illinois is peculiarly appropriate in the case of
Oswald v. Nehls, et. al. 233 Ill. 438, where the court
said: "Regardless, however, of what testimony may be
admitted by the court, the same will be carefully scrutinized."

